The US says it has launched βspace control weaponsβ. It plays into the hands of its enemies

US Air Force Secretary Troy Meink this week announced the United States has deployed what he called βon-orbit space control weaponsβ.
This public statement came as a surprise to many, but not for the reasons you may think. For many years now, China, Russia and the US have accused each other of weaponising space, or of creating an arms race in space. They have all consistently denied doing so. For the US now to declare it has space weapons, it seems like an admission that China and Russiaβs accusations are correct.
Itβs also worrying, because other countries might feel they have permission to do the same. And this would make space very unsafe, increasing the risk of attacks on satellites, which are crucial for modern militaries, as well as daily life on Earth, as we depend on those same satellites for things like GPS, internet, phones, banking, global shipping and transport.
What is a space control weapon?
The term βspace controlβ may seem odd. But it comes from many years of US policies and military doctrines which all state that the US seeks dominance, superiority and control in space.
In 2025, the US Space Force released its Doctrine Document which stated:
space control consists of offensive and defensive actions, referred to as counterspace operations.
Many countries already have so-called counterspace capabilities: the ability to interfere with each otherβs satellites, whether by jamming a communications or GPS signal (which is happening regularly in and around Ukraine), βspoofingβ a false GPS signal to confuse militaries about the whereabouts of their adversaries, cyber attacks, or electronic warfare.
None of this is Star Wars, but all of it can be worrying if it escalates.
As for what US space control weapons actually are, and whether theyβre any different from existing counterspace capabilities, Meink refused to provide any more details.
There are three possibilities. First, they could be nuclear weapons, or weapons of mass destruction, but this is incredibly unlikely. Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty it is illegal to place these weapons in orbit around Earth, or in outer space.
Americans and the Soviets both tested nuclear weapons early in the 1960s, and quickly learned their own satellites, as well as those of allies, were impacted immediately and that orbits remained radioactive over time, meaning it wasnβt in their own interests to use these kinds of weapons. Itβs also nearly impossible to develop or launch these weapons without it being noticed by other countriesβ intelligence-gathering.
Second, the space control weapons could be some other form of physical, or βkineticβ weapons. The Outer Space Treaty doesnβt ban other weapons, so this wouldnβt necessarily be illegal. Conventional explosives donβt work in space, but the Soviets and Americans did test small projectiles from one satellite to another in the 1960s and β70s. It would be surprising if this were to be the case now.
On the other hand, in 2022 China demonstrated the ability to grapple a defunct satellite and tug it about 2,000km away from its orbit. This could be used to remove space debris, but it could also be used to remove an active satellite. There is no evidence the US has this capability.
The third possibility is that Meinkβs statement was a rebranding of existing counterspace capabilities as βweaponsβ, to assert power and maybe try and deter Russia and China from interfering with US satellites. We know both China and Russia have space-based jammers used to interrupt satellite signals, and it would make sense that the US has this capability as well, or something similar.
If this is the case, which I and other global space security experts estimate to be true, it is posturing. But this is still dangerous. It gives China and Russia plenty of justification to point to the US as an aggressor, and ramp up their own space weapons capabilities.
Destabilising space
This public declaration also plays into the hands of China and Russia, which have been proposing a Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space since 2008.
The US and its allies, including Australia, have refused to negotiate the treaty, saying itβs too difficult to know what exactly is a space weapon, and what is being launched.
The Chinese foreign ministry has pointed to Meinkβs statement as evidence of the USβ βweaponization of outer space, turning it into a battlefield, as well as an arms race thereβ. And Russia has called for space to be kept βfree of any weaponsβ.
There has been significant progress in United Nations space arms control discussions over recent years. This statement from the US undermines those efforts.
While some countries still insist the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space is the only solution, there has been some agreement on norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviour in space. In particular, a new norm is emerging against ground-based missiles used as anti-satellite weapons.
Since 1981, every year, the UN General Assembly adopts a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Sadly, the US has refused to support it since 2023. This weekβs declaration fits with this move away from international efforts, which is in line with the current US attitude against international collaboration in general.
Other countries should not shy away from calling out this declaration as escalatory β and should double down on their efforts to prevent an arms race in space when they meet in Geneva this November.

Cassandra Steer has received funding from the Department of Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Geoscience Australia, Home Affairs, the Canadian Department of Defence, the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, and the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. She is CEO of the not-for-profit Australasian Centre for Space Governance.
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